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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the portfolio choice of savings and loan associa-
tions (SLAs) between mortgages and bonds, first in a certainty world and
then under uncertainty. Differences in servicing and transactionscosts,
in default losses, in tax treatment and in the timing ofpayments are
accounted for in a certain world. SLAs are seen as investing in bonds
only if the demand for mortgage funds is sufficiently weak that more prof-
itable SLAs compete away some of the value of their taxpreference by
bidding down mortgage rates; in this case less profitable SLAs would find
corporate debt attractive.
In an uncertain world, mortgages will command a premiumover bonds
to compensate for the prepayment option extendedmortgage borrowers.
The appropriate value of this premium depends onuncertainty regarding
future interest rates and aversion to this uncertainty. SLAs that view
future interest rates as more uncertain than the market doesgenerally,
or who are more averse to this uncertainty, will require an options premium
greater than that determined in the market. Thus they will find corporate
debt to be attractive relative to bonds, even when the demand formortgage
funds is strong and their mortgage tax preference is notcompeted away.
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29The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 caps two decades of occasionally intense efforts to reform the
housing finance system.1! The basic philosophy underlying thoe efforts
and the 1980 Act is that the public interest is best served when individual
firms operate in their own self interest with as little interference as
possible from the government. One of these interferences has been a
prohibition against federally insured savings and loan association
investments in consumer loans and corporate debt securities. The 1980
Act authorizes allocation of up to 20 percent of total assets in these
investments. The subject of this paper is the likelihood that savings
and loans will find it profitable to purchase the second of these assets,
corporate debt securities.
Corporate investment powers were first advocated for savings and
loans in 1961 by the Commission on Money and Credit. The general rationale
offered for greater flexibility in the choice of investments was that the
relaxation of binding portfolio restrictions would stimulate economic
growth.?i This recommendation was repeated a decade later in the Report
of the Presidential Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation
(commonly called the HUNT Commission), which also proposed investment in
equity securities, direct real estate, and some forms of direct loans to
1/Ourfavorite discussion of these efforts and the issues involved is
Patric H. Hendershott and Kevin E. Villani, Regulation and Reform of
the Housing Finance System, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1977.
.?IReportof the Commission on Money and Credit, Prentice-Hall, 1961,
pp. 160-161.2
business such as construction loans. The expansion of investment powers
was recommended on grounds of increased competition and/or public con-
venience./ Rather than passing legislation to provide greater flexibility,
Congress did the reverse in the l970s. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
of 1975 and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1978 both require mortgage
lenders to consider credit needs of the local community. The latter, in
fact, implicitly imposes quotas for local community mortgage investments.
Passage of the Financial Institutions Act of 1975, in part the
legislative embodiment of the HUNT Commission recommendations, would have
permitted savings and loans to invest up to 10 percent of their assets in
high grade corporate bonds. Proponents of this provision argued that
savings and loan earnings would be improved, thereby allowing them to
compete more effectively with commercial banks for deposit funds.
Opponents countered that the provision would reduce the supply of mortgage
credit and result in less housing. The most revealing aspect of this
debate was the absence of the voice of the savings and loans. While they
argued for the ability to make direct real-estate related loans, they
never advocated the corporate bond authority.!/ This alone probably
provides an excellent clue as to the likely expected usage of this
authority.
./ Report of the Presidential Commission on Financial Structure and
Regulation, Washington, GPO, 1971.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban ffairs, the Hearings on
the Financial Institution Act of 1975 94th Congress, first session,
May 1975, p. 165.3
The present paper is divided into two main sections and a summary.
The first examines the choice between bonds and mortgages under certainty.
The coupon rates on bonds and mortgages are seen as being comprable only
after adjusting for differences in servicing and transaction costs, in
default losses, in tax treatment and in the timing of payments. The
likely market relationship between bond and mortgage rates is then considered
in order to detrmine the likelihood that savings and loans will, in fact,
purchase corporate bonds. Section II extends the analysis to an uncertain
world and considers the implications of this uncertainty for mortgage
coupon rates and the portfolio behavior of bothrisk-neutral and risk-averse
associ at ions.
I.Bond and Mortgage Investments Under Certainty
In a certain world, four factors are relevant to the savings
and loan investment choice: mortgage and bond coupon (net of known
default) rates, advantages or disadvantages savings and loans may have in
underwriting mortgages and bonds, any special tax treatment that is
not independent of this choice, and transactions costs of liquidating
assets. Each of these factors is considered in turn. For our current
purposes, all facets of the investment are assumed to beknown in advance
with certainty. Thus, the concept of an exante net yield employed below is
equivalent to an expost yield where expectations are exactly realized.
A. Comparable Bond and Mortgage Coupon Rates
There is no readily available and generally accepted method for
calculating comparable yields. Even quoted mortgage and bond coupon
rates on par value securities of identical default risk are not comparable4
owing to differences in the timing of coupon payments and expected principal
repayments and in the cost of collecting these payments. Bonds promise a
single principal payment at maturity, while mortgage principal is repaid
according to an agreed upon amortization schedule.In addition, the
remaining mortgage principal may be repaid atanytime at the borrower's
option. In an earlier paper, we showed that unless interest rates are
expected to remain constant comparisons are only possible for securities
with the same expected cash flow because unequal flows would be reinvested
at different rates.../ As a first step in making bond and mortgage
coupon rates comparable, we specify the alternative to the purchase of a
mortgage to be the purchase of a portfolio of bonds with expected principal
repayments identical to those expected on a mortgage. Thus the correct
bond rate to compare to the mortgage rate is an appropriately weighted
average of coupons on bonds of varying maturity. Given a continuous and
nonflat yield curve, there is a single maturity bond with a coupon equal
to this weighted average. It is this particular coupon that underlies our
yield comparisons below. In general, this single maturity depends on
interest rate expectations at the time the mortgage is originated.
The mortgages not only repay principal on a different schedule than
bonds but interest as well. Annual bond coupon rates (BCoup) are stated
i"TerminationRates, Interest Rate Uncertainty and Mortgage Rate
Premia: Some Tests From the GNMA Market," presented at a joint
session of the Annual Meetings of the American Economics and Finance
Associations, Denver, Colorado, September 1980.5
as twice the six month coupon rate, and coupons are paid every six months
(a bond with a stated 12 percent annual coupon rate actually pays a 6 per-
cent coupon every six months). Annual mortgage coupon rates (MCoup) are
stated as 12 times the one month coupon rate, and payments are made
monthly (a mortgage with a stated 12 percent annual coupon rate actually
pays 1 percent per month). Moreover, a servicing fee (SER) of between
3/8ths and 1/2 of a percent (at an annual rate) of the outstanding mortgage
principal is typically charged for collection, but no fee is charged for
clipping the bond coupon.
A second difference between coupon rates and expost yields on par value
securities held to maturity is that the former are based on promised pay-
ments and the later on those realized. For our current purpose, we assume
that lenders know in advance that they will lose through default an
annual yield equivalent of dm basis points on mortgages and db basis
points on bonds. The net yield on a mortgage, on an annualized basis
and after adjusting for monthly coupon payments and default losses, is
defined as:
=[1+(MCoupdm_SER)/l2]12
The net yield on a bond, again on an annualized basis and after
adjusting for semi-annual coupon payments and expected default losses, is
defined as:
b =[1+(BCoup_db)/2]2-l
In the certainty model described above, these net yields are comparable
as long as the bond maturity is chosen in the above described manner.
Thus, a firm should invest in bonds if and only if b>m.6
B.Underwriting_Advantages
Origination costs are generally paid by the issuers and thus are
not of concern to the investor. Bond issuers pay investment bnkers
directly to underwrite new issues, and mortgage originators can be viewed
ascharging borrowers an up front fee in a similar manner. However if
savings and loans have a cost advantage in underwriting (originating and
servicing) mortgage loans or corporate bonds, then this might affect
their profits and investment strategy.
Mortgage originating requires fairly close contact with buyers arid
sellers in local markets as well as with a variety of other service
providers. Thus local 'production" offices must be established to take
applications, conduct property appraisals and surveys, verify income,
review title searches of local records and close loans. Mortgage
servicing may also require local market proximity, especially in the
event of default and foreclosure.
Depository institutions have likely enjoyed a comparative cost
advantage in the production of mortgage loans, especially in less densely
populated areas. This is because deposit intermediation requires a
similar network of local offices. Limits on deposit rates stimulated
further branching into smaller sub-markets. The marginal fixed cost of
producing mortgages in existing branch offices thus amounts to little
more than the salary of a loan officer and cost of an additional desk.
Depository institutions have thus been able to operate mortgage production
offices in narrow markets where it may not be feasible for a mortgage
banker to do so.7
It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of this cost advantagein
the past and speculative to do so for the future. Improvementsin
communication and transportation systems reduce the cost advantagesof
physical proximity. For example. the technology currentlyexists for
computerized land recordation systems with long distancetelephone access.
Similarly, most income verification data are computerized. Property
appraisals and surveys must be done locally, butthese services are
typically provided by independent firms and theinformation is easily
communicated over long distances. Even applications may betaken through
the mails, albeit with some delay. Moreover3 the gradual phaseoutof
deposit rate ceilings required by the DepositoryInstitutions Act of
1980 may result in fewer branches. In summary, what cost advantages
savings and loans currently enjoy will likely erode graduallyover time
but not be eliminated completely. Because similar cost advantagesprobably
exist for mortgage servicing in that the collection and compilationof
monthly payments closely resembles the deposit-takingfunction, savings
and loans would also appear to have a comparative advantagein servicing
mortgages..-' This analysis suggests that at least some savings and
loans can compete successfully with mortgage bankers inthe origination
of mortgages for other investors.
Savings and loans have a special advantage in originationsfor their
own investment: they avoid the costs of puttingthe loan in the portfolio
I Moreover, in the event of default, foreclosure requires on-site
representatives and knowledge of local real-estatemarkets and
state and local law regarding the foreclosure process.S
of a permanent lender. These costs include commitment fees or dealer
fees of one sort or another and the additional expense of conveying
information to the lender regarding the probability of loss or"quality
of the underwriting" (the investor may require an independent appraisal
or guarantee, e.g., FHA, PMI, FHMA or FHLMC "approved underwriter').
This special advantage will have one of two possible direct effects.
The first isthatsavings and loans pass these savings on to homebuyers.
The second is that they earn additional profits from mortgage originations
for their own portfolios, profits that will affect the bond/mortgage
investment decision. We have no direct evidence on which of these is
more likely. Intuition suggests that mutually—chartered institutions
are more likely to do the former (especially for depositors) and stock-
chartered institutions the latter. If p is the additional annualized
profit on a dollar of funds invested in mortgages, then the investment
decision becomes: buy bonds if and only if b>m+p.
Next consider the economic potential for savings and loans to
originate corporate securities. The underwriting of corporate debt
requires a substantially different set of skills and services than that
described above. Evaluation of the borrower's credit-worthiness requires
information and sophisticated expertise in analyzing corporate balance
sheets and profit and loss statements, industry trends, etc. Because
corporate debt issues are much larger than mortgage debt issues, there
are economies of scale to this information and expertise. Savings and
loan institutions are at a competitive disadvantage to large investment9
bankers in the underwriting of large corporate issues by major firms and
would not underwrite such loans for their own portfolio. The underwriting
of small corporate loans (commercial and industrial loans) resembles
mortgage underwriting more closely than the underwriting of large corporate
issues. Thus savings and loans likely would have similar production
functions to those of commercial banks for commercial --particularlyreal
estate related --loansand would have obvious advantages over investment
bankers. However, legal restrictions preclude savings and loans from
originating such loans.
C. Tax Preferences of Savings and Loans
The tax-preference currently granted savings and loans (SLAs) is
their ability to compute loan loss reserves that far exceed a reasonable
provision for normal losses.In effect, SLAs have been allowed to transfer
large portions of their before-tax income to reserves, thereby avoiding
taxation on this income. Prior to 1963, the effective tax rate on aggregate
SLA income never exceeded 2 percent; SLAs were, in effect, allowed to
transfer virtually all income to reserves. In the 1962 Revenue Act,
Congress limited the transfer to reserves, with some exceptions, to 60 percent
of taxable income. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 lowered this percentage
in steps over time, still with some exceptions, so that in 1979 the
percentage is only 40.1/
21 The 1969 legislation also introduced a minimum tax of 15 percent to be
applied to SLA tax preferences, the most important of which is the
difference between their bad debt deduction and that allowed under the
experience method, less $10,000 and the regular tax paid. (The minimum
tax has been modified in recent legislation.) In the Financial
Institutions Acts of 1973 and 1975, the Treasury proposed substitution
of a 3 1/2 percent mortgage interest tax credit for the extraordinary
provisions for loan losses.10
The usual approach to the determination of optimal portfolio behavior
is maximization of the net worth of the firm. In general, this is
equivalent to maximizing the discounted present value of expected net
after-tax profits (where the appropriate rate of discount is the after-tax
real rate). To simplify matters, the following two assumptions are added.
First, future interest rates are known with certainty and equal current
rates. Second, there are no transactions costs to buying or selling
securities. Under these assumptions, maximizing net worth is equivalent
to maximizing current after-tax profits.
Here we consider the simple case where total financial assets at
the beginning of the year (A) are exogenous, and there are only two possible
assets in the portfolio, mortgages (M) and bonds (B). The firm is assumed
to carry over these stocks of mortgages M_1 and bonds B...1 with average
net yields of ii and b, respectively. The problem then reduces to the
allocation of new funds made available at the beginning of the year
between bonds and mortgages so as to maximize current profits. The cost
of all funds is, for simplicity, c, which includes the cost of collecting






X is non—investment earnings less costs not otherwise specified,
F is the amount of "new funds" made available at the beginning of
the period.[F =AL+R,whereAL •is the (exogenous) net increase
in liabilities and R is the repayment from amortization and
prepayment 5.]
is the proportion of new funds invested in mortgages, and
p is the profit from the mortgage underwriting of loans held.
The SLA is assumed to pay thenormaltax rate,7, subject to an
extraordinary provision for loan loss reserves. This provision is calculated
in the following manner. If the SLA holds 82 percent or more of its
assets in mortgages (the dominant "qualified" asset), then it pays
taxes on l- of its "taxable" income (by statute,is currently 0.4);
if the SLA holds less than 60 percent of its assets in mortgages, then it
pays taxes on all of its income; for each percentage point below 82, but
above 60, the firm holds in mortgages, the fraction of income that is
not taxed is reduced by three-quarters of a percentage point ./ In
effect, the SLA is allowed to avoid paying tax on a fraction (s) of its
normally taxable income. That is,
=[1—7(l—s)]'b-, (2)
!I These are the current regulations for SLAs. MSBs pay taxes on 1- of
their taxable income if they hold more than 72 percent of their assets
in the favored investment, and for each percentage point below 72, but







Aslong as >O.82 or <O.6, there is no tax advantage to incremental
investmentin mortgagesand the investment rule derived in the previous
section holds, namely purchase bonds if b>m-i-p. Themore interestingcase
arises when O.6<O.82. To determine the allocation of new funds to
mortgages that maximizes after-tax profit in this case, we take the
partial derivative of (2) with respect to, after substituting from
(1) and allowing for the dependency of s on S,setthe result equal to






where =[(l--O.75(O.82-M1/A)]is the effective tax rate when no
mortgages are purchased.13
An explicit expression for current purchases of bonds,B, can be obtained
by substituting the definitions 6* =Mr/F,where M is current mortgage
pp
purchases, and M 4-B=Finto (3) and solving
B (1- b-c )F + (1-MA. (4)
2[b-(m+p)] l.i5
Bondpurchases will be greater,
(i) the greater is thenetpremium earned on bonds [b-(rn+p)],
(ii) the greater are net funds (F),
(iii) the lower is the premium earned on bonds over the cost of
funds (the greater is this premium, the more valuable are
mortgages as a device to lower taxes)
(iv) the lower is the effective tax rate in the absence of
mortgage purchases (1).
D.Transactions Costs and Other Factors
Technically, the only relevant range for solutions in the model are
for 6* between zero and one. In this range, the maximization implies
thatthe after-tax yield on the marginal dollar invested in mortgages
equals the after-tax yield of the marginal dollar invested in bonds.
Beyond this range other factors not incorporated in the model, such as
transactions costs and capital gains taxes, come intoplay.
When5k>l, current after-tax profit may (or may not) be increased
by selling existing bonds in the portfolio and buying new mortgages with14
the proceeds. The result depends on the treatment of realized capital
losses (or gains) and sales transactions costs involved. Because SLAs
currently do not hold bonds to sell, this case may not appear relevant.
However, we note that the issue of mortgage-backed bonds is analogous
to the liquidation of bonds from the ass.et portfolio. Finally, when
<O, possibly the firm should sell mortgages out of its existing portfolio
and buy bonds. Again, the ability to sell existing mortgaqes, the existence
of sales costs, and the tax treatment of capital gains or losses are
relevant.It may be optimal to buy only bonds for several years, rather
than to sell existing mortgages, in order to avoid transactions costs.
Consider the implications of the additional transactions costs
involved in selling existing mortgages. Suppose that<O. We can calculate
the mortgage yield such that the SLA firm is holding the desired stock





where the three terms denote the yield earned on bonds, the tax advantage
foregone by investing in bonds, and the origination profits lost by invest-
ing in bonds. Let t denote the annualized yield equivalent sales cost
of selling a dollar of mortgages. The firm should sell mortgages and
buy bonds if the yield it gives up (m+t) is less thanm°, the yield
at which it is willing to hold mortgages. If m+t>m0, then the
salescosts are greater than the potential yield advantage to the sale
andthe firm is better off not selling old mortgages to buy new ones.15
E. Determination of Market Yields
Asdiscussed above, savings and loan assocations receive a tax
preference that allows them to invest profitably in mortgages at alower
yield than other investors. Here we consider how this preference may
affect the determination of market yields, assuming that markets equilibrate
after-tax net yields.
Asupplycurve for mortgage credit at savings and loans may be
derived directly fromequation (3) by multiplyingthrough by new funds (F)
and summing across all n institutions. The total (implicitly annual)flow






where the isubcript refers to the ith individual SLA. The may
vary widely across associations owing to differencesin yields on existing
bonds and mortgages (5andii),inother income and expenses (X), and
in effective tax rates (M_1/A). Equation (5) indicated the relationship
between mortgage and bond rates that is consistent with zero desired
mortgage purchases (
=0).By setting *= 1and solving form1, we can
obtain the relationship that is consistent with zero desired bond purchases:
=b -o.75T (7)
(l—)A+0.75TF
This differs from (5) only in the appearance of 0.757F in thedenominator.
Table 1 illustrates the sensitivity of SLA flow mortgage supply to a key16
Table 1: The Spread (in Basis Points) Between the
Net Bond and Mortgage Rates That Would Result in the
Purchase of Only Bonds or Mortgages*
Assumed Profit Mortgage Purchases Bond Purchases
Rate(b/A) Only Only
0.001 b-rn< 4 b-rn> 5
0.005 b-rn<23 b-rn> 25
0.01 h—rn<45 b—rn> 50
0.015 b-m<68 b-rn> 75
0.02 b-m<91 b-rn>lOO
* Assumed values of other variables: p = 0.0,=O.5,7O.25, F = O.2.
variable,the before-tax return on assets.2! When the spread between the
netbond and mortgage rates is large, say 100 basis points, only associations
with very high profit rtes,'rb/>o.o2, will purchase mortgages. As the
mortgage rate rises relative to the bond rate, SLAs with lower and lower
profits will find it advantageous to purchase mortgages. As the profit
rate approaches zero, associations will purchase mortgages only if the
mortgage rate (plus p) approaches the bond rate.
We may infer the following regarding the properties of this supply
function. First, there is a net mortgage rate sufficiently below the
net bond rate such that no SLAs will invest in new mortgages. This rate
is denoted in Chart I by rn and depends on:(l) the increase in the portion
of income upon which savings and loans pay taxes when they shift from
2!Forthe savings and loan industry as a whole,7Tb/A rose from 0.0081
in the first half of 1976 to 0.0121 in the second half of 1978 and fell
back to 0.0009 in the first half of 1980.17
qualified to other assets --thecurrent three-quarters of a percentage
point and (2) the profit rate of the most profitable institution.
Second, as the net mortgage rate increases, progressively more thrifts
will find it profitable to invest in mortgages and the share of deposits
allocated to mortgages by individual SLA firms will rise. At the extreme,
all new funds of all SLAs --eventhose with no profits --willbe invested
in mortgages when the net mortgage rate approaches the net bond rate.
These properties allow us to specify a continuous (and, for simplicity,
linear), rising aggregate mortgage credit supply function for SLAs as
dericted in Chart I. In this model the supply of mortgage credit at




Tax Preferences, the Demand for Mortgage Credit




because this supply was taken as exogenous. However, at the point where
m=b, "bond" investors switch to mortgages either directly or via the
purchase of GNMAs, FHLMC participation certificates or FNMAdebt.19!
Thus the aggregate flow supply of mortgage credit, S, becomes horizontal
atb.
When the flow demand for mortgage credit by households, D1, falls short
of the potential supply at SLAs, the equilibrium before-tax net mortgage
yield is below the before-tax net bond yield, only investors
with tax preferences invest in mortgages, and some tax preference investors
(e.g., those with low profits or little marginal tax preference) invest
in bonds. When the household demand for mortgage credit, D2, exceeds
the potential supply by tax-preference investors, the equilibrium before-tax
net mortgage yield equals the before-tax net bond yield, and some SLAs may be
indifferent to bonds if there is no tax consequence.
Before concluding this section, it is probably useful to consider
the implications of a reduction in, or outright removal of, the savings
and loan tax preference. In 1978, the Treasury proposed a gradual
reduction in the percentage of taxable income that can be transferred to
loan loss reserves from 40 to 30, and preliminary discussions were based
on a reduction to 20. More recently, the Interagency Task Force onThrift
E.IFora discussion of this behavior, see Hendershott and Villani,
"SecondaryMortgage Markets and the Cost of Mortgage Funds,"
AREUEAJournal, vol. 8, Spring1980.19
Institutions implicitly recommended removal of the tax preference.Ji/
Removal would make the entire supply schedule in Chart I horizontal;
savings and loans would be indifferent between bonds and mortgages unless
there were profits from originating mortgages for their own investment.
More importantly, removal might cause sayings and loans to invest as much
as 10 percent of their assets in tax-exempt securities..1?!
II. Bond and Mortgage Investment with Uncertainty
In the simple model employed above, portfolio decisions were assumed
to be motivated by net (of taxes, transactions costs and default losses)
yields, wiere the relevant variables in the yield equations were assumed
to be known with certainty. Here we allow for uncertain future interest
rates and describe the relationship between mortgage and deposit life and
actual future interest rates. Part A of this section describes the various
"options" that characterize the SLA portfolio. Part B discusses how
efficient financial markets would price these options, how these prices
should affect market-determined mortgage and bond coupon rates, and how
.11.!TheReport of the Interagency Task Force on Thrift Institutions,
Department of the Treasury, June 30, 1980, pp. 107-1 13. The Task
Force was established, at least in part, to study the problems
that SLAs might have during the transition to competitive markets.
The Task Force then implicitly proposed a tax increase (removal of
the tax preference) as a cure for the problem of severely depressed
SLA earnings.
1?!PatricH. Hendershott and Timothy W. Koch, "The Demand for
Tax-Exempts by Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance,
June 1980.20
heterogeneous interest-rate expectations will lead some associations to
invest in bonds. The portfolio risk of SLAs and the investment strategy
of risk-averse associations is the subject of Part C.
A. Portfolio_0ptionsl'
Inour earlier analysis we compared net yields on a mortgage and a
bond, assuming that they had identical, certain repayment cash flows
and that future interest rates were known with certainty. If we were to
drop only the interest rate assumption, then interest rate outcomes
other than those expected would affect the values of these investments
identically. Unexpectedly low interest rates raise the market values of
both by equal amounts and unexpectedly high interest rates do the opposite.
However, mortgage cash flows are not certain, and are in fact correlated
with interest rates. The stochastic mortgage cash flow is related to
the "put and call options" imbedded in mortgage contracts. In addition,
depositors may prematurely cash existing certificates if interest rates
rise sufficiently. As it turns out, this is a "put option" which has the
same properties as mortgage put options.
The typical manner in which SLAs originate mortgages is to give (for
an "origination fee") a commitment to a homebuyer that the lender is
willing to make a loan at a predetermined rate of interest and, implicitly,
price (loan principal less points). The homebuyer has bought a put-option
For a fuller discussion of these options, see Kenneth J. Thygerson,
"Futures, Options, and the Savings and Loan Business," in this volume.21
from the lender; i.e., he has the right to "put" the loan in the lenders'
portfolio during the life of the commitment which may vary from a month
to over a year. The value of the put option to the homebuyer at the
time of loan closing is positively related to the spread between the
commitment rate and the new issue spot rate.
A second form of put options SLAs often implicitly sell is also con-
tained in the mortgage contract. Borrowers can terminate fewer (or
more) than the normal volume of mortgages. When interest rates rise,
more mortgages will be assumed by buyers than is normally the case, and
some homeowners will forego moving so as to avoid giving up their now
below-market fixed-rate mortgage. In effect, borrowers have "put" a
greater than anticipated volume of "old" mortgages in the lenders' port-
folio. Conversely, when interest rates fall, borrowers will "call"
mortgages and refinance them at lower rates.
A third form of put options SLAs implicitly sell relates to their
deposits. Consider the simple case of a fixed-rate, two-year certificate
with no penalties for early withdrawal. If interest rates rise after
one year, then the certificate-holder will "put" the certificate back in
the lenders' portfolio. That is, the holder has the right to cash the
certificate in at par value when the market value is below par. In
reality, penalties limit this potential, but the "put options" aspect of
SLA certificates nevertheless remains.
The portfolio ofsavingsand loans is thus exposed to incredible
options risks. SLAs sell put options for new mortgage loans (commitments),C-
oldmortgage loans (assumptions) and deposits (early withdrawal). Moreover,
they sell call options on mortgage loans (refinancings). Most important,
the effect of the put options is cumulative; i.e., there is a strong
likelihood that they will all be exercised if interest rates rise sharply.
B. Options Pricing, Market Yields and Portfolio Choice
Conceptually, we may separate mortgage yields into two component
parts. The first reflects the cost of financing when the terms of the
contract --thetiming and magnitude of all interest and principal
payments --areknown with certainty. The second reflects the price of
the "option' that the timing and/or magnitude may differ from that contracted
for. In Section I we described the determination of market yields when
the terms were known with certainty. Here we provide an intuitive
description of how competitive, risk-neutral markets would price the
"options" in mortgage and savings certificate contracts and point out the
implications for mortgage and bond yield comparisons and portfolio choice.
When a borrower exercises his "option" to default on a mortgage
loan, the investor loses interest (during the period in which the loan
is in default) and perhaps principal (depending on the proceeds from sale
upon foreclosure). Similarly, when interest rates falland a mortgage
is refinanced, the investor loses the difference in interest payments
over the life of the loan. The loss from an assumption or deliveryof a
mortgage against a below-market rate commitment, or the loss fromthe
cashing in of a certificate of deposit at an old rate and the reissueat23
a higher rate may be calculated in a similar manner. In other words, we
may calculate the actual loss when the option is exercised.
We do not know a'priori when, or if, the option will be exercised.
But we may know what the determinants of the exercise of the option are,
and we can assign a.'priori probabilities to the likelihood that these
determinants will take on the value such that the option will be exercised.
The appropriately discounted present value of the product of these





l,j is the contingent probability distribution based on current
expectations that the option will be exercised in period j,
L is the loss in period j if the option is exercised,
iis the nominal risk-free discount rate, and
n hh
lj L = 1. L•
h=l3 3
Thesuperscripts denote the likelihood of a particular outcome (h)
resulting in the exercise of the option and the loss associated with
that outcome.
In the case of commitments, refinancings and assumptions, the
contingent probabilities and the loss if the option is exercised depend
on the difference between current and expected future mortgage rates.
Similarly, the contingent probabilities and the loss from early withdrawal24
depend on the difference between current and expected future deposit
rates. In both cases, the loss associated with every potential interest-
rate outcome is weighted by the anticipated likelihood with which it will
h
occur. For example, 12 could be the likelihood, given current expectations,
that the mortgage rate will be 200 basis points (h =200)less in two
h
years than it is now. L2 is the loss resulting from refinancingsin this
event.
For a mortgage commitment, lenders typically charge a front end price
proportional to the principal. This is a single-premium fee (commitment
fee) which in competitive, risk-neutral markets will equal the "actuarial"
present value of the loss. The price of the refinancing and assumability
options are typically paid in the form of a higher mortgage coupon rate,
where the premia built into the rate, 0m' is determined actuarially
such that the discounted present value of the monthly premia and the
probability-weighted losses are equal.
The actuarial monthly premia for mortgage default risk and semi-
annual mortgage premia for bond default risk are calculated in a similar
manner and were defined above as dm and db, respectively. The net-yield
on a par-value mortgage, adjusted for the "actuarially" determined
monthly options and default premia in mortgage rates, is:
=[l+(MCoup_Om_dm_SER)/12]12_l.
The net yield on a par-value bond adjusted for the actuarially determined
semi—annual options (Ob) and default premia in bond rates is:
b° =[l+(BCoup_Ob_db)/2]2-l.25
In the absence of tax preferences, the bond purchase decision is
again buy bonds if and only if b°> m0+p, where the yields are defined
above and p equals any excess returns to mortgages placed in the firms'
own portfolio.
If potential investors have homogeneous or uniform interest-rate
expectations and thus identical valuations of Om(and of Ob). then
competitive, risk-neutral capital markets will --inthe absence of tax
preferences or relative underwriting advantages to the marginal investor --
equateh° and m0. However, if expectations and thus valuations are
heterogeneous, then those with valuations of options risk that are greater
than the "market's" will tend to purchase bonds and others will favor
mortgages. Thus bonds provide a useful alternative to associations who
believe that the options premium incorporated in the mortgage coupon rate
Is insufficient.
We may calculate, in a similar manner, the cost to the firm of the
borrowers' ability to cash in existing certificates if the advantages of
doing so outweigh the penalities. Competitive, risk-neutral deposit
markets will equate this cost, c0, to the yield on otherwise comparable
securities without the early withdrawal feature.
C. Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice
The above discussion suggested that SLAs are subject to substantial
upside interest-rate risk. This is no surprise to students of the savings
and loan industry. Even if the options premia built into mortgage coupon
rates and the inflation premium built into interest rates generally had
accurately reflected expectations at the time loans were made, substantial26
SLA losses would have resulted from actualinflation rates- and interest
rates being much higher than generally expectedduring the past 15 years.
Moreover, recent volatility in interest ratesand the uncertainty regarding
the future has dramatically increased theactuarially_determined price of
options in the SLA portfolio. Thisresults because —-basedon a'priori
expectations --theprobability that a given option willbe exercised is
increased by interest-rate uncertainty. In theremainder of this section,
we modify our earlier model toallow for this risk and ask how aversion
to this risk might affect the bond/mortgageinvestment decision of savings
and loans.
The analysis of Section I is altered inthat profit is now a
random variable because a number of itsdeterminants are stochastically
determined. In addition, for our current purpose weextend the model to
include liabilities with a maturity greaterthan one periods although all
liabilities issued at the same point in time areat the same rate. The
proportion of liabilities issued with greaterthan one-period maturity,
which pay ,isdenoted by1. The expression for after-tax profitis
then
7Y [l_(l-s)]4jM_l4b B_l_[c+(l_V)cL_l+&m+(1- S)b]F-cALI
m, b and c are all stochasticrandom variables, F =L+R,
and L_1 =B1+M_1+R,where R equals repayments (made at the beginningof
the period). The stochastic behavior of M_1results from the mortgage
comitment and assumability put options and
the refinancing and the call27
option.The stochastic behavior ofresults from the early withdrawal
feature of certificates.
To determine the implications of a change in interestrates for the
profitability of an existing portfolio, we calculate the differential of
the above expression (holdingconstant) and divide through by dcJ/
By definition, R/ôm ='M_j/m. By assumption, interest rates
on old and new securities are initially equal and all interest rateson
new securities change by the same amount (dc =dm=db).The
resulting expression is
d7/dc =[l_'(l_s)]db/dc,where
dv7lb/dc =-(1- - -(-c)L1(/c).
Maturity Mortgage Early
Imbalance Options Withdrawal
The first two terms on the right-hand side of the aboveexpression
reflect the maturity imbalance loss or gainJ./ This is thechange in profit
on the existing stock of assets financed at the new liability rate and
on that part of the reinvestment of repayments that is financed by old
ii! Technically the expression is notdifferentiable because the options
risk of rising interest rates is not symmetric with theoptions risk
of falling interest rates. Here we describe theimplications of a
rise or fal1separately.
.i./ For a useful discussion of thematurity inbalance problem, see
Dwight 1. Jaffee, "The Asset/Liability Maturity Mix of S&Ls:
Problems and Solutions," Change in the Savings and LoanIndustry,
Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference, FHLB of San Francisco,
1976.28
deposits. The change in profit is symmetric with respect to rising or
falling interest rates. That is, the loss from a rise in rates [assuming
that R<(l- Z)L_1] equals the gain from a fall in rates of equal magnitude.
Regarding the third term on the right-hand side, when dm>O,(M..1/èm)
is the increase in the existing mortgage stock from commitments and
assumptions; when dm<O,(ô1_1/èm) is the decrease in the existing
mortgage stock from refinancing. The loss to profits in either event is
simply the product of the change in mortgage and bond revenue per dollar
change in the existing mortgage stock times the change in the stock.
There is no a'prior reason to believe that these two effects are of the
same magnitude for positive and negative rate changes. But it is the
case that after-tax profit will unambiguously decline as a result of
the stochastic behavior of M1 in response to increases or decreases
in interest rates.
The fourth term reflects the increased cost of refinancing old
deposit certificates at the new deposit rate. The greater the rise in
rate and the response of depositors to this rate, the greater the loss.
This term is only defined for dc>O because there is no gain from falling
interest rates.
When interest rates rise unexpectedly, SLAs lose on four counts:
the rise in the cost of new liabilities not offset by a rise in earnings
on existing asset holdings, the refinancing of old liabilities at higher
rates, the exercise of outstanding mortgage commitments, and the increase
in assumptions. Thus SLA firms are exposed to substantial risk from29
unexpectedly rising interest rates. There are immediate remedies to
these sources of potential loss: shorter effective term mortgages
(VRMs and RRMs) and longer term deposits, stiffer penalities for early
withdrawal, and enforcement of due on sale clauses to reduce assumptions.
SLAs have recently taken actions in all •of these areas. In addition to
these direct mechanisms, SLAs may purchase put options --secondarymarket
commitments --tooffset partially the put options they sell. But there
are limits as to how much maturity imbalance and options risk can be reduced
by making changes in mortgage and savings certificate contracts, and the
purchase of commitments is relatively expensive. Another wa,y to reduce
the risk to the total portfolio of rising interest rates is to purchase
relatively shorter-term and/or noricallable corporate securities. That is,
risk-averse SLAs may buy noncallable bonds when b° is slightly less
than m°+p, even after allowance for the tax advantage.i! They may
be willing to accept lower expected profit for improved stability and
less risk of loss from an unexpected secular increase in interest rates.
III. Summary
The extent to which any investor would purchase corporate debt
securities, as opposed to mortgages, obviously depends on a comparison
!i Another possible reason for investment in bonds is diversification
against the risk of default. Mortgage default depends on the real
value of homeowner equity which in turn is related to the rate of
inflation in house prices. Corporate default depends on earnings
which in turn depend on the general state of the economy. A mixed
portfolio of mortgages and bonds is thus somewhat diversified against
the risks of falling house prices and declining economic activity.30
of yields on bonds and mortgages. The comparison is manageablein a
world where future interest rates, termination or repayment rates,and
default rates are known with certainty. Coupon rates on equaleffective-
maturity par-value bonds and mortgages can be adjustedfor known default
losses and for differences in servicing costs and in payment periods.We
denote these adjusted rates by b and m.The appropriate investment
strategy is simply to choose the asset with the greateradjusted coupon
rate.
Of course, there is substantial interest-rate uncertainty, and, as a
result, cash flow uncertainty. Unexpected cash flow outcomestend to
affect the returns on mortgages adversely relative tothose of bond
portfolios. Lower than expected interest ratesincrease refinancings
and reduce assumptions, thereby producing greater than expectedcash
flows to be invested at the unexpectedly low yield. Higherthan expected
interest rates increase assumptions and decrease the willingnessof
households to move, producing lower than expected cash flows tobe reinvested
at unexpectedly high yields. Thus, no matter how interestrates evolve,
the expost difference in holding period returns on mortgagesand bonds
will fall short of the difference in adjusted coupon rates.To compensate
for the likelihood of these adverse changes in mortgagetermination rates
and the resultant shortfall in relative expost return, an options
premium must be built into mortgage coupon rates.We denote the difference
between the individual association's valuation of theannualized premium31
necessary to make them indifferent between bonds and mortgages that are
otherwise equivalent investments and the market's valuation by (opt).
With uncertainty, the investment rule is buy bonds if b°>m°-Ø(opt).
While this rule might be appropriate for life insurance companies
and pension funds, it is not correct for savings and loan associations
because they have two special incentives to invest in mortgages. First,
if mortgage bankers can originate and place mortgages in the portfolios of
ultimate investors without losing money, then savings and loans can
surely originate for their own portfolios at a profit. The annualized
yield equivalent of this extra profit is represented by 8(orig). Second,
there are, or can be, tax preferences for marginal investments of savings
and loans in mortgages. The value of these, which depends on the association's
before-tax profits per dollar of assets and percentage of assets already
in mortgages, is represented by(tax). With these adjustments, the
investment strategy for a risk-neutral savings and loan now becomes:
buy bonds if
b > m-Ø'(opt) +e(orig)+'(tax).
This rule only holds for the investment of "new" funds, i.e., increases in
liabilities plus repayments of assets; if the association is contemplating
the sale of existing mortgages to purchase bonds, then the probably
prohibitive sales costs must be taken into account.
One further point regarding the bond-mortgage investment choice. In
the 1970s savings and loan associations were subject to enormous upside
interest-rate risk. Unexpected increases in rates raised interest expense32
faster then interest income because the average maturity of liabilities
was shorter than that of assets. Moreover, the effective maturity of
liabilities would shorten (early withdrawals would occur) and that of
mortgages would lengthen (more mortgages would be assumed and households
would become less mobile). This risk could have been tempered by investment
in noncallable, shorter term corporate debt. The recent increase in
penalties for early withdrawal of deposits and the shift to variable
rate, rollover and equity participation mortgages has reduced this risk,
although the increased volatility of interest rates has mitigated the
reduction. In any event, the above investment rule should be tilted
slightly toward bonds for associations that are averse to this risk.
The final question is:if savings and loans follow the appropriate
bond investment rule, will they actually purchase bonds? The answer, of
course, depends upon what mortgage and bond coupon rates are, in fact,
determined in the marketplace. Under present tax law and assuming
homogeneous interest-rate expectations, it appears that relatively profitable
risk-neutral assocations would never wish to purchase bonds and that
less profitable associations would do so only when the demand for mortgage
funds is weak. That is, probably no risk-neutral associations would
have invested in corporate debt in the 1976-79 period had the option been
available. If the demand for mortgage funds is weak, then more profitable
savings and loans will compete away some of the value of the tax preference
by bidding down mortgage rates, and less profitable associations will
find corporate debt to be an attractive alternative. Moreover, noncallable,
shorter term corporate debt would be more attractive to risk-averse33
associations. If the tax preferences of savings and loans were removed,
then risk-averse associations would likely make significant use of their
authority and all associations would probably allocate significant funds
to tax-exempt securities. Lastly, if interest rate expectations are
heterogeneous, sone associations will bQlieve that the options premium
built into the mortgage coupon rate is insufficient to compensate for
mortgage cash flow uncertainty. These associations will tend tofind
bonds to be an attractive alternative to mortgages.